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Neutralization of the Money Stock — Comment
by MICHAEL W. KERAN
JJ . .. -
ii IENDERSHOTT raises some mnterestmg issues
with respect to my earlier critique of his neutralized
money stock concept. Before considering the specific
issues he raises, it would be useful to define certain
relevant terms. This will allow us to more sharply
focus the debate with respect to areas of agreement
and disagreement.
1) Federal Reserve Actions — A most comprehen-
sive measure of Federal Reserve actions are changes
in Federal Reserve holdings of government securities
adjusted for changes in reserve requirements. Hen-
dershott calls this (p*), and uses this as his measure
of Federal Reserve policy actions. This measure simul-
taneously captures the two major policy instruments
of the Federal Reserve: open market operations, and
changes in reserve requirements. Other Federal Re-
serve policy instruments, such as the discount rate,
are generally assumed either to move in line with
or to be of lesser importance.
2) Defensive and Dynamic Operations — Federal
Reserve actions (Pa), as described in (1), can be
divided into defensive operations and dynamic op-
erations. Defensive operations are those Federal Re-
serve actions which are designed to prevent undesired
changes in member bank reserves (or some other
intermediate financial target) as a result of changes
in factors not under the control of the Federal Re-
serve, such as offsetting gold flows or changes in Fed-
eral Reserve float. Dynamic operations are Federal
Reserve actions designed to change the desired level
of member bank reserves (or some other intermediate
financial target) in response to changes in monetary
policy. As dynamic operations represent the Federal
Reserve economic policy actions, they are assumed to
vary systematically over the business cycle.
3) Monetary Influence on the Economy — This
should reflect the net impact of all monetary influ-
ences on the real sector of the economy, that is, em-
ployment, income, and prices. This influence may or
may not be under the dominant control of the Federal
Reserve, depending upon how the Federal Reserve
has actually operated. The appropriate measure of
this monetary influence depends upon the linkage
between monetary variables and the rest of the econ-
omy. One’s concept of these linkages depends upon
one’s assumptions about economic behavior. Keyne-
sian income-expenditure theory has typically meas-
ured this influence by market interest rates, while the
modern quantity theory has typically measured it by
changes in the money stock.
Hendershott’s concern is with the first point- He
wishes to construct an unbiased measure of Federal
Reserve policy actions. This is a useful exercise in its
own right, but it cannot be considered as providing
evidence or insight into point (3) listed above, The
best measure of Federal Reserve policy actions is not
necessarily the best measure of monetary influence
on the economy. This second question requires a
separate theoretical and empirical verification which
is not attempted either by Hendershott or by me in
this article.’
t
The author has considered the question of monetary influ-
ences on the economy in other articles. See Michael N.
Keran, this Review, November 1969 and February 1970.
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Hendershott points out that Ia minconsistent in
rejecting the neutralized money stock as a measure
of monetary policy actions when I have presumably
accepted the principle of neutralization with respect
to government spending and tax receipts as a measure
of fiscal policy actions. He then attempts to demon-
strate that the error one makes in analyzing policy
actions of the Federal Reserve without a neutralized
money stock is of the same character as in analyzing
policy actions of the Federal Government without
“neutralized” receipts and expenditures.
I do accept the conceptual desirability of a neutral-
ized money stock as an unbiased measure of Federal
Reserve policy actions, with the previously mentioned
caveat that this should not be considered as providing
any information with respect to monetary influences
on the economy. My disagreement with I-Iendershott
is on the empirical relevance of his particular neu-
tralization process.
I tried to make that point in my original article
when I said, “what if open market operations had
not been conducted in a way to offset the influence
of borrowings and gold on the money stock? In that
case Hendershott’s neutralized money stock would
have been a superior measure of Federal Reserve
(policy) actions.”2
My disagreement with Hendershott is with respect
to the interpretation of Federal Reserve actions, (P0)
I assert that this is a measure of both policy actions
and non-policy actions related to offsetting non-con-
trolled sources of member bank reserves. Stated in a
somewhat different way, the Federal Reserve engages
in both defensive operations and dynamic operations,
and only the latter should be considered as policy
actions. Hendershott, on the other hand, asserts that
(~)is an appropriate measure of “just” policy
actions.
The issue \vhich separates us is not theoretical but
empirical in nature. As such, it is subject to standard
statistical tests. In the original article I presented such
a statistical test.3 It indicated that a substantial share
of the changes in P0 (I used the symbol 5,3 could
be explained by defensive operations designed to
offset influences, on member bank reserves from
changes in non-controlled sources of reserves.
2
Michael Keran, “Reply,” this Recicw (August 1969), p. 17.
~Ibid., p. 17.
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If the Fcdcril Reserxe had not acted in this sys
teinatic way to offset non-controlled sources of re-
serves, then the question of whether the neutralized
money stock was a superior measure of Federal Re-
serve policy actions would depend on how well Hen-
dershott’s explanation of public influences on these
non-controlled sources of reserves stood up under
critical analysis. Because I-Iendershott’s results had
not passed the first test, I did not examine his results
in detail to see whether they had passed the second
test.
Hendershott ‘irgucs that the public through its in
fluence on market interest rates, will influence certain
sources of member bank reserves (specifically gold
flows and member bank borrowing), and through
this the observed money stock. When this public
influence is estunited md removed sve have in the
neutralized money stock an unbiased nieasure of
Federal Reserse policy actions My position is that
whatever the cause of the gold flow or changes m
member bank boiros\ing the Federal Reserve has
acted to systematically offset their influence on mem-
ber bank reserves through the standard and long
standing procedure of defensive operations. On the
basis of empirically verifying the existence of defen-
sive operations to offset the influences of gold and
borrowings on member bank reserves, I asserted that
the observed money stock is superior to the neutral-
ized money stock as a measure of Federal Reserve
policy actions.
Hendershott does not question the statistical re-
sults presented. On what basis then could he continue
to press this position that ~* measures Federal Re-
serve policy actions? He must assume that Federal
Reserve defensive behavior is systematically different
during periods when the Federal Reserve is following
a tight money policy than during periods when it is
following an easy money policy. That is, when the
Federal Reserve wishes to follow an easy money p01-
icy it will not engage in net defensive operations
which would tend to reduce total reserves of member
banks. When the Federal Reserve is engaged in a
tight money policy, it would not engage in net de-
fensive operations which increase total reserves.
Only if Federal Reserve defensive operations are
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assert that all Federal Reserve actions (P0) be
evaluated in a uniform way rather than being divided
into defensive and dynamic operations. Two tests of
this possibility are made. The first is to compare
Federal Reserve defensive operations during periods
of tight money policy with defensive operations dur-
ing periods of easy money policy. A “Chow” test wifi
tell us whether the data for these subperiods were
dra\vn from different behavior populations.
The second test focuses on gold flows and member
bank borrowings from the Federal Reserve. Because
these are the major factors causing the neutralized
money stock to deviate from the actual money stock,
it is desirable to see if the value of these defensive
coefficients changes between periods of tight and
easy money policy.
To make the tests in such a way as to provide
the greatest chance to validate Flendershott’s position,
periods of tight money policy arid easy money policy
are constructed according to the breakdown given by
Hendershott.4
Easy Periods
Aug. 1953 - April 1955
Nov. 1957 - Aug. 1958
NIarch 1960- Jan. 1962
Oct. 1962 - Dec. 1964
The results of the first test are presented in Table I.
The dependent variable is Federal Reserve holdings
of Government securities adjusted for a change in
reserve requirements (~P°).The independent varia-
bles are all other factors which influence member
bank reserves and are not directly controlled by the
Federal Reserve. If the Federal Reserve engaged in
defensive operations, the sign of the gold, float, and
borrowing coefficients would be negative, and the
sign of the currency coefficient would be positive. The
sign of the “other” coefficient is indetenninant.°
The first column shows the estimated coefficients
for defensive operations in tight money periods, as
designated by Hendershott, and the second column
shows the estimated coefficients for his designated
easy money periods. The Chow test, which is designed
to test for a shift in the structure between these pe-
riods, was not significant at the 95 per cent level of
confidence. There is no statistical evidence that the
Patric Hendershott, “A Quality Theory of Money,” Nebraska
Journal of Economics and Business (Autumn 1969).
tm
This is because it is a conibinatic,n of sources and uses of
member bank reserves.
Table I
FEDERAL RESERVE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
(Monthly C ntrol Offer nc s B,llion, a Dollar I
Ap at, UIAG aM As-,- ao~- -Ac
T,gF,t Mar, y Eo yMca y
Periods Period
Geld (AG) .53 —
72) (322)
Float (AF) 09 27
(44) (1 68)
Borrowing (As) .63 9
(288) (2.9
Other (AD) 9 2
(3 3) 71)
Currency ,n Hands
of Public tACo) 1 22 1 27
(861) (1058)
Conslont Term — .03 Di
K 81 68
OW i8l 1.6
No ii ,,oncftTi, htopfi ‘~rh, ‘6 tii
mn,arhlo e cen, I its ~ tl,s’ nto non lid nOn .1,1 he
e dl, ion hn d p ulint hi OWl
Do I, -Wa on t 6’
Reserse conduct d defensu e operation di
dunng period of easy mo ey than d ing
of tight money.°
The second test estimates the value of coefficients
for the same variables as in Table I for the entire
period, and compares them to the coefficients for just
the tight money periods.7 If, between periods of tight
and easy money, the Federal Reserve had engaged
in different defensive operations with respect to any
6
Perfect defensive operations could have implied coefficients
with absolute x-alnles close to 1.0. In all cases the coefficients
in Table I are significantly different from one (1) for both
periods. Only defensive operations are accounted for in this
regression. By introducing variables to account for dynamic
operations, the estimations would have been more efficient.
For an example of both defensive and dynamic operations
as an explanation of AP°,see Michael W. Keran and Christo-
pher T. Babb, “An Explanation of Federal Reserve Actions
(1933-68)”, this Review (July 1969) pp. 7-20. In this latter
case, the values of the estimated defensive coefficients are
not significantly different from one in absolute value. 7
This approach uses multiplicative dummy variables which
have the property of allowing for slufts in the slopes of
the independent variables between the two periods. See
Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (John Wiley





April 1955 - Nov. 1957
Aug. 1958 - March 1960
Jan. 1962 - Oct. 1962
Even though there was no shift in the general
structure of Federal Reserve behavior between sub-
periods of tight and easy money, it is possible that
Federal Reserve actions with respect to particular
variables could have changed between subperiods.
Because gold and member bank borrowings were
found by Hendershott to dominate the difference
between the actual and the neutralized money stock,
it is important to see whether there was a shift in the
value of these coefficients between periods of tight
and easy money. This is done in the second test, and
the results are presented in Table II.
Page 17MAY, 1970
which indicates that the Federal Reserve’s response
to these independent influences on member bank
reserves was not significantly different during pe-
riods of tight and easy money policy. There is no
statistical evidence that the Federal Reserve had
responded to changes in gold and borrowings dif-
ferently during the subperiods.
The statistical tests represented in Table I and
Table II are consistent with each other, The results
in Table I show that total Federal Reserve defensive
operations did not change between the two periods.
Table II indicates that Federal Reserve behavior,
with respect to gold and borrowings, did not change
between subperiods. To state these results in statisti-
cal jargon, Hendershott’s results have passed neither
the F test (Table I), nor the t test (Table II) of
statistical significance. Therefore, it must be con-
cluded that Federal Reserve defensive operations
are not sensitive to changes in Federal Reserve pol-
icy, and that Hendershott is not justified in treating
(P°) as responsive to just policy changes. Because
the neutralized money stock does not consider the
interaction between Federal Reserve holdings of
Government securities (P°) and other sources and
uses of reserves, it is not an unbiased measure of
Federal Reserve policy actions.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
Table II
F DERAI. RESERVE DEFEWSVE OPERATIONS
(Monthly C ntrol Differenc s Billions of Dollars)
(ionuey 1952 December 196
Total Tight Mon y
Period Per ods
Gotd (AG) 63 09
(4 17) (30)
Float (AP) 31 .57
(217) (1 84)
Borrowings (AS) 98 .33
(328) 80)
Other (40) .2 115
~46~ t2 *41
Curr ncy n Hand
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of the variables specified the second series of esti
mated coefficients would be statistically significant.
If the Federal Reserve had not responded in different
ways between subperiods then the second group of
coefficients ‘ssould not be statistically significant.
In Table II the t statistics in the tight mon y period
for gold and borro~s ing ire statistically insignificant
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The above two articles are available as Reprint No. 56.
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